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Abstract
Objectives—Using data from a randomized experiment, to examine whether moving youth out
of areas of concentrated poverty, where a disproportionate amount of crime occurs, prevents
involvement in crime.
Methods—We draw on new administrative data from the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development’s Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment. MTO families were
randomized into an experimental group offered a housing voucher that could only be used to move
to a low-poverty neighborhood, a Section 8 housing group offered a standard housing voucher,
and a control group. This paper focuses on MTO youth ages 15–25 in 2001 (n = 4,643) and
analyzes intention to treat effects on neighborhood characteristics and criminal behavior (number
of violent- and property-crime arrests) through 10 years after randomization.
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Results—We find the offer of a housing voucher generates large improvements in neighborhood
conditions that attenuate over time and initially generates substantial reductions in violent-crime
arrests and sizable increases in property-crime arrests for experimental group males. The crime
effects attenuate over time along with differences in neighborhood conditions.
Conclusions—Our findings suggest that criminal behavior is more strongly related to current
neighborhood conditions (situational neighborhood effects) than to past neighborhood conditions
(developmental neighborhood effects). The MTO design makes it difficult to determine which
specific neighborhood characteristics are most important for criminal behavior. Our administrative
data analyses could be affected by differences across areas in the likelihood that a crime results in
an arrest.
Keywords
Crime; Neighborhood effects; Randomized experiment; Long-term impacts; Poverty
Introduction
One of the most striking features of crime in America is its disproportionate concentration in
disadvantaged, racially segregated communities. For example, in 2008, the homicide rate in
Hyde Park, the economically and racially mixed neighborhood that is home to the
University of Chicago, was 3 per 100,000. In adjacent Washington Park, where over half of
residents are poor and 98 % are African-American, the homicide rate was nearly 20 times
higher. In its explanation of the riots of 1967, the Kerner Commission cited the destructive
role of “the black ghettos where segregation and poverty converge on the young to destroy
opportunity and enforce failure. Crime, drug addiction, dependency on welfare, and
bitterness and resentment against society in general and white society in particular are the
result” (Kerner et al. 1988, p.10). Neighborhood environments potentially can affect
criminal behavior through several mechanisms, including peer groups and social interactions
(Cook and Goss 1996; Gaviria and Raphael 2001; Glaeser et al. 1996), as well as the quality
of local public goods such as schools and police (Becker and Murphy 2000).
A large body of non-experimental empirical research documents that youth and adults living
in more disadvantaged, disordered neighborhoods are at elevated risk of engaging in crime
even after statistical regression adjustment is made to account for individual-level
observable socio-demographic characteristics and other risk factors. In a recent review of the
“neighborhood effects” literature, Sampson et al. (2002) concluded that the evidence linking
neighborhood processes to crime is stronger than evidence linking neighborhood processes
to other outcomes such as health. This non-experimental research raises the question of
whether moving people out of areas of concentrated poverty can prevent them from
becoming involved in criminal activity.
This question is difficult to answer with non-experimental methods because most families
have some degree of choice over where they live and with whom they associate. There
necessarily remains much uncertainty about the degree to which non-experimental studies
are able to isolate the causal effects of neighborhood environments themselves on criminal
behavior from the impacts of hard-to-measure individual or family attributes associated with
both residential selection and criminal propensities. Experimental methods that generate
exogenous variation in neighborhood environments can provide more plausibly causal
estimates of the impacts of neighborhoods on criminal behavior (for a summary of this
methodological literature, see Cook et al. 2008).
In this paper, we discuss what is known about the long-term effects of moving from a very
distressed to a less-distressed neighborhood, drawing on new data from the U.S. Department
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of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Moving to Opportunity (MTO) randomized
residential mobility experiment. A randomized lottery provided families—living in high-
poverty public housing at five sites (Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New
York)—with the opportunity to move to lower-poverty neighborhoods with a housing
voucher. We utilize administrative and survey data collected as part of the “long-term” study
of MTO families measuring outcomes 10–15 years after baseline. Our paper builds on the
“interim” MTO study by Kling et al. (2005), which focused on MTO youth—the age group
at highest risk for crime involvement—and examined outcomes of those who were aged 15–
25 at 4–7 years after baseline to answer three key questions: (1) does moving youth out of
areas of concentrated poverty prevent involvement in crime; (2) do these neighborhoods
effects vary over time; and (3) do the effects differ by gender?
That study found that the offer of an MTO housing voucher reduced lifetime violent-crime
arrests by 32% and property-crime arrests by 33% for females in the experimental group
relative to their control group counterparts. In contrast, for males in the experimental group,
the offer of a voucher increased lifetime property-crime arrests by 32% relative to controls
and the associated reduction in lifetime violent-crime arrests was not statistically significant;
however, in the first 2 years after random assignment, violent-crime arrests for males offered
an experimental voucher were statistically significantly lower (by 34%) than for controls.
Overall across types of crime, females in the experimental group experienced a significantly
lower (by 37%) number of arrests relative to controls while the slightly higher number of
arrests for experimental group males relative to controls was not statistically significant.
Using interim MTO data, Ludwig and Kling (2007) found that racial segregation appears to
be the most important neighborhood characteristic in predicting youth violence involvement,
more so than a neighborhood’s rate of poverty or violent crime, which were generally not
statistically significant predictors.
We present new results demonstrating that there is an attenuation over time of these MTO
effects on male criminal behavior for the same cohort of youth examined by Kling et al.
(2005). We examine new data on these youth covering 10 years after the time of random
assignment.1 Fade-out over the longer-term is apparent for MTO’s interim adverse effects
on property offending by male youth and for beneficial, protective effects in reducing youth
violence involvement. We present evidence suggesting that this fade-out of MTO crime
impacts for males appears to be partly explained by the attenuation of MTO treatment
impacts on neighborhood conditions over time.
The dynamic pattern of MTO crime impacts seems more concordant with a behavioral
model emphasizing contemporaneous rather than past neighborhood conditions in driving
crime, or what Sampson (2012) calls “situational” rather than “developmental”
neighborhood effects. The situational neighborhood effects hypothesis suggests that the
offending behavior even of adolescents who have been exposed for many years to distressed
neighborhood environments may respond to changes in community contexts.2 Our results
are consistent with some of the previous situational neighborhood effects research
suggesting that even modest changes to the “in the moment” decision-making environment
can substantially affect criminal behavior. Other examples include work by Ronald Clarke
and others on ‘situational crime prevention’ (Clarke 1995; Homel and Clarke 1997; Cornish
1Other studies of data from the long-term MTO follow-up find beneficial effects on adult physical health, specifically extreme obesity
and diabetes (Ludwig et al. 2011) and on adult subjective well-being (Ludwig et al. 2012). See Sanbonmatsu et al. (2011) and Ludwig
et al. (2013) for summaries of long-term MTO findings.
2Consider a model in which criminal behavior in time period T, YT, is potentially affected by someone’s entire accumulated history
of exposure to different neighborhood conditions: YT=f(XT, XT-1, …, X0). Criminal behavior could be affected by neighborhood
conditions in time T, XT (“situational neighborhood effects”) and/or by neighborhood conditions in some previous period, XT-K
(“developmental neighborhood effects”).
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and Clarke 2003), the discussion by Zimring (2011) of the determinants of New York City’s
crime drop, and the recent cognitive behavioral therapy study by Heller et al. (2013).
The next section briefly reviews the candidate mechanisms through which neighborhood
environments might influence crime and violence. The third section provides a very brief
review of previous non-experimental studies. Section four discusses the MTO experiment,
section five discusses our data sources and analytic methods, section six presents our main
empirical findings, and the final section discusses the implication of our results for public
policy and other attempts to carry out long-term follow-ups of randomized social
experiments.
Candidate mechanisms
Many theories of crime suggest that people engage in crime because they lack impulse
control, future orientation or other non-academic factors (what researchers variously call
“non-cognitive” or social-cognitive skills), or because people have poor earnings prospects
in the legal labor market (perhaps due to low levels of either academic or non-academic
skills) and so view criminal behavior as a superior alternative (Gottfredson and Hirschi
1990; LaGrange and Silverman 1999). These theories imply that the accumulated exposure
of young people to neighborhood environments is important in affecting risk of criminal
involvement by changing people’s development of academic or non-academic skills.
Neighborhood environments may shape the developmental environments in which children
grow up partly by affecting the quality of local public schools, which previous research
suggests varies dramatically across areas (Rivkin et al. 2005). Neighborhood social
conditions may also affect the developmental environments children experience if for
example neighborhood adults or peers generate human capital externalities (Borjas 1995), or
if local adults act as role models that change the incentives that young people perceive for
investing in human capital (Wilson 1987).
MTO could have effects on risky or criminal behavior mediated through MTO’s impacts on
household environments important for child development. Parental unemployment,
substance use, poor mental health, exposure to community violence, and inadequate housing
may be risk factors for child maltreatment. Each of these risk factors could be affected by
MTO. Previous research also suggests that neighborhood social conditions (such as crime
and violence) may change the way that parents monitor and supervise their children
(Furstenberg et al. 1999).
These “developmental neighborhood effects” hypotheses imply that MTO children who are
relatively younger at baseline (and so will experience more exposure to new neighborhood
environments at any given follow-up point) should be more affected by MTO moves than
those who are older at baseline. This is particularly true if there are developmentally
“sensitive” or “critical” periods (Knudsen et al. 2006; Shonkoff and Phillips 2000; Shonkoff
et al. 2012). Sensitive periods are hypothesized to be ages in which development of certain
skills or developmental processes are particularly susceptible to environmental influences,
which in our case is the social environment of the neighborhood, but are not necessarily the
only times in which those skills or processes can be modified. Critical periods are thought to
be ages at which some skills or developmental processes are shaped, after which they are
largely fixed.
Other neighborhood effect theories implicitly argue instead that contemporaneous
neighborhood environments should be most important for affecting criminal behavior by
young people. For example, urban planners and criminologists have been concerned with the
possibility that some building designs contribute to crime, for example, through the
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construction of enclosed stairwells in public housing buildings that are difficult for local
residents to monitor. Neighborhoods may also vary in the willingness of local adults to
monitor public space and enforce shared values as in the “collective efficacy” model of
Sampsonet al. (1997) (see also Coleman 1988).
It is possible that high-crime neighborhoods might have policing of lower quality or quantity
compared with more affluent areas. Whether or not such variation in policing exists depends
in part on the degree to which policymakers choose to allocate additional police resources to
the highest-crime neighborhoods (Sherman 2002), as well as on the intensity of patrol
activities in different areas, the degree to which community members are willing to work
with police to solve cases, and how police use their discretion to make arrests. If youth move
to neighborhoods with more or more intensive policing, MTO could increase the likelihood
of a youth being arrested for any given level of actual criminal activity. Previous research
raises the possibility that minorities may be at particularly elevated risk for being arrested,
even after controlling for frequency of involvement with criminal behavior and other risk
factors such as neighborhood type, family income, and educational history (Huizinga et al.
2007).
A large literature suggests that contemporaneous peer influences should affect decisions
about engaging in crime, or what Jencks and Mayer (1990) call “epidemic models,” which
emphasize the power of peers to spread behaviors. Such contagion effects can arise from
learning criminal behavior from peers, pure preference externalities (individuals enjoy
imitating their peers), stigma effects and social norms (the negative signal from criminal
behavior declines when more people do them), and physical externalities (for example,
higher rates of crime reduce the chances of getting arrested because of congestion effects in
law enforcement); see Kleiman (1993), Cook and Goss (1996), Glaeser and Scheinkman
(1999), Brock and Durlauf (2001), Manski (2000), and Moffitt (2001). Some epidemic
models predict peer influences on youth criminal behavior that vary with the prevalence of
peer criminal behavior within a community, potentially leading to nonlinearities in peer
effects or “tipping points.”
Although most behavioral models predict that MTO moves should reduce youth
involvement with risky or criminal behavior, Jencks and Mayer’s discussion implies that
other outcomes are possible. Competition models emphasize the competition between
neighbors for scarce resources like grades or jobs. Failure in the competition for pro-social
rewards may lead youth to compete instead for anti-social rewards, which could elevate risk
for criminal involvement. Relative deprivation models focus on negative psychological
impacts from experiencing a decline in one’s relative material or social standing (Luttmer
2005). These theories about the potential adverse effects of moving into a less distressed,
disadvantaged neighborhood also seem to emphasize contemporaneous over cumulative or
lagged neighborhood conditions experienced by young people.
Kling et al. (2005) discuss possible explanations for the gender differences they observe for
MTO’s impacts on criminal offending. Male and female youth might move to different
neighborhoods. Minority males might face greater discrimination than females in their new
neighborhoods or they might sort into higher risk peer groups. Males might adopt a more
confrontation strategy in adapting to their new environments whereas females might turn to
adults for support. Lastly, males may be more likely than females to take advantage of their
comparative advantage in their new neighborhood to commit property offenses. In their
view, the comparative advantage in property offenses is the explanation that seems most
likely.
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The non-experimental empirical literature reveals mixed results on the importance of these
theoretical neighborhood mechanisms in affecting risky and criminal behaviors. Case and
Katz (1991) found strong relationships between one’s own risky and delinquent behaviors
and that of one’s peers for illegal drug use, alcohol use, and criminal offending in the Boston
Youth Survey. However, Esbensen and Huizinga (1990) found that the level of
disorganization of the neighborhood was not associated with neighborhood-level prevalence
or frequency of drug use. Studies of a sample of young black women in Chicago found some
relationship between pregnancy risk and low neighborhood socioeconomic status (Hogan
and Kitagawa 1985) and evidence that this risk was related to lower contraceptive use
(Hogan et al. 1985). The proportion of managerial workers in a census tract has been shown
to be related to teen childbearing (Brooks-Gunn et al. 1993; Crane 1991), but Case and Katz
(1991) did not find direct evidence of peer influences on out-of-wedlock childbearing.
The non-experimental research provides stronger support for an association between
neighborhood attributes and involvement with crime or violence. An influential non-
experimental study on this question is Sampson et al’s (1997) analysis of data from the
Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN). Their analysis found
one of the best predictors for involvement in violence is a neighborhood’s degree of
informal social control combined with social cohesion and trust—what they term “collective
efficacy.”
Collective efficacy is found to have a robust association with violence even after controlling
for a rich set of individual-level characteristics, and seems to mediate the effects of other
neighborhood attributes such as socioeconomic composition (Sampson and Raudenbush
1999; Morenoff et al. 2001; Sampson et al. 2005). Similar patterns of results have been
reported in multiple studies including Hirschfield and Bowers (1997), Warner and Rountree
(1997), Bellair (2000), Wikström and Loeber (2000), Beyers et al. (2001), and Simons et al.
(2004). Sampson et al (2002) provide an excellent survey of such studies. A more recent
observational study drawing on PHDCN data presents suggestive evidence of a non-linear
relationship between youth violence involvement and exposure to violent peers, where the
effect of exposure to additional violent peers declines at higher levels of peer violence
(Zimmerman and Messner 2010).
The Moving to Opportunity experiment
The MTO experiment was designed to test the impact of moving families living in public
housing projects in the most disadvantaged neighborhoods in American cities into
neighborhoods with much lower poverty rates using private housing vouchers. Eligibility
was limited by design to families living at baseline in public housing units operated by local
government housing authorities. In 1994, HUD began randomly assigning eligible low-
income families with young children who volunteered to participate in MTO into three
different groups:
• The experimental group (or low-poverty voucher group) was offered a housing
voucher that could only be used in neighborhoods where the poverty rate was 10 %
or less according to the 1990 census.3 This group was also provided with
counseling to help locate an appropriate unit and neighborhood.
• Families assigned to the “Section 8” housing group (or traditional voucher group)
were offered standard housing vouchers that could be used for any unit that met
basic standards, but were not restricted geographically.
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• The control group did not receive any special MTO funding, but could receive any
of the regularly available social services for which they would have been eligible
regardless of the experiment.
In total, 4,600 families representing about one-quarter of the universe of eligible families in
the target public housing projects signed up for MTO between 1994 and 1998 (Goering et al.
1999, table 5). Although all families assigned to the experimental and Section 8 groups were
offered housing vouchers, only around 47 % in the experimental group and 63 % in the
Section 8 group used the voucher to move. Despite less than complete compliance with the
MTO treatment, the random assignment of MTO families into treatment and control groups
alleviates concerns about selection effects (see further discussion below). Furthermore, these
utilization rates are consistent with rates observed in studies of other housing voucher
programs (Olsen 2003; Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000). Some families did not use their
voucher because they could not find an affordable unit within the time limits of the program.
Finding affordable housing may have been particularly challenging for families in the
experimental group because they were restricted to searching in low-poverty census tracts.
The tight housing markets of some of the MTO cities during this time period also
contributed to the difficulty of finding suitable units.
A baseline survey that HUD administered to all families when they applied for MTO
provides baseline characteristics of the adults who were assigned to the three different
groups. Averaged across the five MTO study sites, about two-thirds of all the participants
were African-American and about one-third were Hispanic. However, in two of the sites,
Chicago and Baltimore, the participating families were overwhelmingly African-American,
while the other three demonstration sites (Boston, Los Angeles, and New York City)
participants were more evenly mixed between African-American and Hispanic.
Concerns about crime and safety play an important role in motivating families to participate
in MTO. Around 40 % reported living with someone who had been victimized in the last six
months. Three-quarters of the respondents reported a desire to get away from drugs and
gangs; half reported they wished to find better schools for their children as their primary or
secondary reason for moving.
Table 1 presents the baseline characteristics of the sample of youth that is the focus of this
paper—those who were ages 15–25 at the end of 2001 and ages 17–28 as of the end of the
follow-up period for this paper, or 10 years after random assignment (n=4,643). As detailed
below, these youth were not eligible for the youth survey that was part of the MTO long-
term (10–15) evaluation because they were over age 20 as of December 2007—the point at
which eligibility for the survey sample was determined. In other published work on the long-
term evaluation, this group is known as “grown children”. This is essentially the same
cohort studied using data from the interim MTO evaluation (4- to 7–year follow-up) by
Kling et al. (2005), although there are a few differences in the two samples. However, we
have added youth whose families were randomized in 1998, the last year of MTO
recruitment. In addition, we have excluded a small number of youth who were 18 or older at
baseline, and we have decided to include youth even if they moved to other jurisdictions at
some point after random assignment. As expected, due to the random assignment of families
3Olsen (2003, pp. 365–441) provides an excellent review of the housing voucher program, which provides families with a subsidy to
live in private-market housing. The maximum voucher subsidy is determined by the Fair Market Rent (FMR), which is a function of
family size, the gender mix of adults and children in the home, and the local rent distribution. For a family of four, the FMR is
between 40 and 50 % of the local metropolitan area private-market rent distribution. For example, the FMR for a two-bedroom
apartment in the Chicago area was equal to $699 in 1994, $732 in 1997, and $762 in 2000. Families are expected to pay 30 % of their
income (adjusted by family size, childcare expenses and medical expenses) towards their rent. Note that, in the United States, housing
assistance is not an entitlement, so housing voucher (and other housing) programs usually have long wait lists. Olsen estimates that
only around 28 % of income-eligible families in the U.S. receive any housing assistance.
Sciandra et al. Page 7













to the treatment and control groups, baseline characteristics of youth generally do not differ
by treatment status. An omnibus F test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the full set of
baseline characteristics controlled for in our analysis (listed in Appendix Table 3) is the
same for youth in the experimental group and the control group (P=0.74) or the Section 8
group and controls (P=0.43).
The distribution of behavioral outcomes is quite different for boys versus girls. At baseline,
parents were more likely to report behavioral and emotional issues for boys than for girls.
Nearly 20% of boys (compared with some 10% of girls) had recently been suspended or
expelled from school. Behavioral/emotional, learning, and physical health problems were all
about twice as prevalent among boys as girls. Violent crime arrests were somewhat higher
for experimental and Section 8 boys than for controls, but pre-random assignment
differences could occur by chance. We also control for pre-random assignment arrests in our
analysis, although as mentioned above, there is no overall pattern of pre-randomization
differences between the control group and either the experimental or Section 8 group.
Because previous MTO studies have found that boys and girls also respond differently to
MTO-assisted moves into less distressed neighborhoods (Kling et al. 2005; Kling et al.
2007), we follow previous MTO work and analyze the data separately by gender.
Data and methods
This section discusses the data sources analyzed in the present paper, which come from
longitudinal arrest records and in-person parent surveys collected for the long-term MTO
evaluation to measure outcomes through 10–15 years after the time of random assignment.
Given the randomized experimental design, our analysis methods are straightforward. We
begin by presenting “intention to treat” (ITT) estimates, which represent the effects of being
offered the chance to move through MTO. Since not all families offered a MTO voucher
actually moved through the program, the ITT will understate the effects of actually moving
through MTO. Accordingly, we also present estimates that use the randomized treatment
group as an instrument for actually moving with an MTO voucher to estimate the effects of
moving for those families who actually moved—the so-called “treatment on the treated”
(TOT) estimates.
Data sources and measures
Our data on criminal behavior are derived from administrative arrest records. Information on
potential mediating processes comes from constructing an address history for each youth
and linking these addresses to census tract data.
Arrest data—We use administrative arrest records to construct measures of the number of
times that a youth was arrested between the MTO random assignment and the end of the
tenth year (fortieth quarter) after random assignment.4 Arrest records include information on
the date of all arrests, each criminal charge for which the individual was arrested, and
typically information on dispositions as well.
Because studies of criminal behavior often find that interventions can have qualitatively
different impacts on different types of offenses, we analyze MTO impacts on total arrests as
well as arrests for specific types of crimes, with a focus on violent and property offenses. As
in most samples, our violent offense category is dominated by assault (simple or aggravated)
and to a lesser extent robbery (where the perpetrator uses or threatens force) and a much
4Another difference between the present study and Kling et al. (2005) is that the interim study counted by quarter from the specific
date of random assignment whereas in our study we set the quarter of random assignment to “quarter 0” and the next calendar quarter
to “quarter 1”.
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smaller number of arrests for the more serious crimes such as murder, rape, or kidnapping.
Larceny or thefts that do not involve contact with the victim were the most common type of
property offense with other types including burglary, breaking and entering or trespassing,
and motor vehicle theft. Total arrests includes both violent and property crime as well as
other types of crime such as drug offenses, disorderly conduct, vandalism, and weapons
violations (such as carrying a gun illegally). If a youth was charged with more than one
offense on the date of the arrest, we characterize the arrest using the most serious charge.
We select the most serious charge based on New York State criminal law classification
because New York provided us with information on only the most serious criminal charge
per arrest. Thus, applying New York’s criteria to other states (where we have all charges
associated with each arrest) helps improve data consistency across states. We obtain results
similar to those reported below using other methods for selecting the most serious charge
per arrest, in part because the majority of arrests involve charges for only a single criminal
offense. Arrests that occurred prior to randomization are controlled for in the statistical
analysis (that is, used as explanatory variables), but were not included in the outcome
measures.
We attempted to match youth to both adult and juvenile arrest records using information
such as name, social security number, birth date, sex, and race. We obtained individual-level
adult and juvenile records the states of California, Illinois, Maryland, and Massachusetts; de
identified adult data from New York State (where de-identified records were randomly
assigned to respondents with the same treatment status, gender, and year of birth); juvenile
data from New York City Department of Probation, which should capture juvenile arrests
that occur within the city; and adult or juvenile records from 8 additional states in which
participants have lived. New York’s criminal justice system classifies arrestees as “adults” at
a very young age (16), so a substantial proportion of all teen arrests will be included in the
adult arrest histories for this state. The detailed information available with these arrest
histories enables us to focus on program impacts for different types of criminal offenses.
As a sensitivity analysis, we relax the assumption that the effect on arrests is the same across
youth who entered the program at different ages, given a growing body of research in
developmental psychology and related fields that raises the possibility that developmental
plasticity may decline with age. We re-estimate these impacts interacting baseline age with
treatment status and gender.
Neighborhood characteristics—For each youth, we constructed an address history
using information from MTO program operations, the U.S. Postal Service’s National
Change of Address system, local housing authorities, HUD administrative records, in-person
tracking of youth at the interim follow-up, and from interviews conducted with their parent
(or other adult in the family). Youth analyzed in this paper were ages 21 to 30 at the time of
the final evaluation (2008–2010) and were not part of the interview sample. Although we
did not interview these youth, we did ask the adult respondent whether the youth still lived
with them and, if not, for their current address. For about 70 % of the youth, we interviewed
their parent or another adult member of the household during the MTO final evaluation.
Consistent with our initial concerns about the difficulty of locating these youth for
interview, three quarters of the adults reported that the youth no longer lived with them and
half could not (or declined to) provide a current address for the youth. And in fact we are
missing a long-term survey address for even more of these youth (about 70 %) because we
do not have proxy report of addresses for youth in families where the adult was not
interviewed. In some instances, we also obtained address updates at final for these youth
through HUD administrative records and mailings to the families.
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We built on the algorithm that Abt Associates developed for the interim MTO study to
determine which addresses were reliable and to stitch together the addresses into a
continuous address history that approximates when and how long the youth lived at each
address (Orr et al. 2003). Creating a continuous address history required certain
assumptions, namely that the youth remained at their last known address through the end of
the follow-up period. Therefore, we assume that youth for whom we were unable to obtain
an address update as part of the long-term survey (and for whom no HUD administrative
address updates were available) continued living at their address from the interim survey.
The neighborhood unit that we analyze in this paper is the census tract, so we geocoded the
addresses in the history and then linked them to census tract characteristics for that time
period interpolated from the 1990 and 2000 U.S. decennial censuses and the 2005–09 five-
year averages from the American Community Survey. Census tracts are geographic areas
defined by the U.S. Census Bureau that typically contain 2,500 to 8,000 residents, with
boundaries that were originally drawn to be “homogenous with respect to population
characteristics, economic status, and living conditions” (U.S. Census Bureau, Washington,
DC, 2000). We use census tract poverty rates (the fraction of persons in the tract living
below the poverty threshold) as our primary measure of neighborhood characteristics
because the MTO program was explicitly designed to change the poverty rate of program
participants’ neighborhoods. Given the strong correlation of poverty with other measures of
neighborhood socioeconomic composition, the poverty rate can be viewed as a proxy for the
bundle of neighborhood characteristics that are changing. In addition to poverty, we analyze
the share of tract residents who are members of racial or ethnic minority groups, the share of
adults who are college-educated, the share of families headed by single females, the shared
of the civilian population who are employed, and average household income (in 2009
dollars). For each 2-year period after random assignment, we present estimates of treatment
effects on neighborhood share poor and share minority to analyze the dynamics of the
impact of MTO on neighborhood conditions.5 Families enrolled in MTO from 1994 to 1998,
and therefore the calendar period represented by each 2-year period after random assignment
varies across families.
Although this paper focuses on census tract as the neighborhood unit, an advantage of MTO
over non-experimental neighborhood effect studies is that we do not need to clearly specify
the neighborhood unit because the randomized MTO intervention generates differences in
the neighborhood conditions experienced by MTO families assigned to the treatment and
control groups for almost all of the candidate geographic areas definitions that have been
used in the previous literature (e.g., block, block group, tract, ZIP code). Consider, for
example, if the key driver of criminal behavior is the poverty rate in a youth’s apartment
building, and not in the rest of the census tract. In a non-experimental study, if we include
the wrong neighborhood characteristic as an independent variable in a regression model
predicting criminal behavior (or another outcome), we might erroneously conclude that
neighborhood effects do not matter. Random assignment assures that our estimates of the
impacts of the MTO program (see next section) do not depend on correctly defining the
neighborhood unit. Nonetheless, the lack of clarity about the correct definition of
neighborhood does limit our ability to estimate the effect of a unit change in a given
neighborhood condition on an outcome of interest (e.g., criminal behavior).
Since this is a special issue of the journal devoted to long-term follow-ups of participants in
randomized experiments, it is worth mentioning the challenge of successfully tracking low-
5We also present estimates of treatment effects on a broader range of neighborhood characteristics averaged (using duration weights)
across all addresses between random assignment and May 31, 2008, just prior to the start of the MTO long-term survey fielding
period.
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income families over such an extended period (10–15 years after baseline). To carry out the
surveys, our research team subcontracted with the Survey Research Center (SRC) at the
University of Michigan. The success of the long-term surveys was due in large part to the
tremendous skill of SRC, which also employed two-stage sampling (Groves et al. 2004) to
increase the efficiency of the data collection effort and managed to achieve an 88–90 %
effective response rate (ERR) for MTO youth and adults that was quite similar across
randomized MTO groups. Our ERR calculation weights cases from the second phase of
fielding in which a subsample of hard-to-reach cases were selected for additional outreach
efforts (see Gebler et al. (2012) for further details on SRC’s participant tracking and
recruitment efforts and special end-game strategies). This success derived from HUD’s
foresight in supporting the tracking of MTO families over the entire study period, including
periodically supporting active tracking (canvassing) efforts. Such tracking activities proved
to be an astute investment that could be a model for other sponsors of social experiments.
We do not have self-reports for these youth from the MTO 10- to 15-year evaluation
because they were not part of our sample frame. One challenge with long-term follow-up
studies is how to optimally allocate finite data-collection resources across program
participants. Even with the generous support of a long list of funders (see
acknowledgements below), we were forced to choose which two of the following three
study populations we would survey: (1) parents in the MTO households; (2) the youth who
were the focus of the interim (4- to 7-year) follow-up who were now mostly grown children
living apart from their parents; or (3) those participants who were young children at the time
of the interim study but by the time of the long-term follow-up had entered their peak
offending ages. We focused on samples (1) and (3) because it allowed us to economize on
survey costs as the younger youth were more likely to be still living at home and because it
allowed us to for the first time measure a number of key outcomes for youth who were under
age 6 at the time their families enrolled in the program. These youth were of particular
interest because they experienced very large neighborhood changes during the most
developmentally sensitive time period. The tradeoff, however, in focusing on this group was
to lose observing the same cohort of youth over the two consecutive follow-ups. However,
to mitigate this loss, we did collect administrative data such as the arrest histories and we
also asked the adult interviewed in the household about the older youth.
We test the sensitivity of our estimates of impacts on neighborhood characteristics to the
types of address information available for the youth. We re-estimate our model using only
those individuals for whom we have fairly complete address information because their
parent provided us with an update on them during the final evaluation. We also look at
whether the results differ if we limit our analyses to those youth who were still living with
their parent. Lastly, we re-estimate the data using only the addresses of the youth up through
age 18 and assuming the youth’s addresses remained unchanged beyond age 18. This
approach is similar to the overall approach of creating a continuous address history from
data that includes gaps by definition (described above). In some cases the address at age 18
will in fact be the same as the interim survey address, meaning for some youth their last
known address was their address at ages as young as 15.
Analytical methods
The random assignment of families to different treatment conditions allows us to identify the
causal effects of being offered a housing voucher by comparing the average outcomes of
youth assigned to each treatment group (experimental or Section 8) with youth assigned to
the control group.6 We focus our analyses on the intent to treat (ITT) effect or the effect of
the offer of services through MTO for the entire treatment group, which consists of both
families who took up the treatment (i.e. used the voucher) and those who did not. Let Y
represent an outcome of interest. We estimate a model using data from all three MTO
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groups with two separate indicators for assignment to the experimental and Section 8
groups: Zexp and Zs8. We calculate the ITT effects of assignment to the experimental and
Section 8 groups as the two elements of π1 in Eq. (1) using ordinary least squares,
conditioning on a set of (pre-random assignment) baseline characteristics (X), where i
indexes individuals.
(1)
The control group is the omitted category in the model, and the treatment group indicators,
Zexp and Zs8, represent the average difference between the control and treatment groups.
Baseline characteristics include site, socio-demographic characteristics about the household
and youth, and youth experiences in school such as expulsions or enrollment in gifted and
talented classes, and in our models of arrests, we also include indicators for the number of
arrests prior to random assignment for violent, property, and drug or other offenses. We
show the complete list of covariates in Appendix Table 3. In our analyses, we apply
sampling weights (individuals within treatment groups are weighted by their inverse
probability of assignment to the group to account for changes in the random assignment
ratios) and cluster the data to adjust the standard errors for the presence of multiple youth
from the same family. Significance levels are reported using two-tailed hypothesis tests.
Because this is a special issue dedicated to understanding how the effects of social
experiments evolve over time, we present the results of estimating Eq. (1) separately for
different two-year windows following baseline (that is, 1–2 years after randomization, 3–4
years after randomization, etc., up to 9–10 years after randomization). For completeness, we
also present results that show outcomes averaged over the entire 1- to 10-year post-
randomization period.
To examine whether treatment effects vary by gender, we modify Eq. (1) to include
interactions between the treatment indicators and male and female gender:
(2)
An indicator for male is also included as an element of X. In Eq. (2), the effect of the
experimental group treatment for males is represented by π20 and for females is represented
by π21. We also present estimates of the difference between the estimated effects for males
and females (π20− π21).
Note that, while the ITT estimate will understate the effects of actually moving through
MTO, since around 42 % of the families of youth assigned to the experimental group and 58
% of those assigned to the Section 8 group relocated with an MTO voucher, the ITT still
constitutes an unbiased estimate of the effects of offering families the chance to move
through MTO. Because the ITT estimator compares the average outcome of the control
group with the average outcome of all families assigned to one of our two treatment groups,
regardless of whether or not the family assigned to the treatment group relocates through
MTO, the ITT estimate is not susceptible to concerns about “selection bias” that plague non-
experimental estimation approaches. Random assignment ensures that, absent the MTO
6The offer of a housing voucher in MTO is the chance to move to a new neighborhood characterized by a range of different socio-
demographic, physical, and other features. As discussed below, MTO is less informative about the causal effects of particular elements
within the bundle of neighborhood characteristics that change via MTO moves, but it does provide very strong grounds for inference
about the causal effects of changing that bundle of neighborhood features.
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intervention, control and treatment group families would have had the same outcomes, on
average, and that any post-baseline differences between the two groups can be attributed to
the intervention itself. Thus, the ITT estimate reflects the effects of being offered an MTO
voucher. The intervention in MTO is the opportunity to change neighborhoods, and so the
ITT estimate will be non-zero if the effect of changing neighborhood conditions on the risk
of involvement in crime, violence, or other behaviors is not zero. Ludwig and colleagues
(2008) discuss these issues in greater detail.
Two other potential issues that warrant discussion are differences between “compliers”—
those who moved as a result of the program—and “non-compliers”—those who did not
make program moves—as well as whether merely being given the option of moving could
have affected families. Previous MTO research has shown that compliers and non-compliers
differ on a number of baseline characteristics (Ludwig and Kling 2007; Shroder 2002).
These correlates of the motivation to take up the MTO offer do not bias our experimental
estimates of the effects of the offer of a housing voucher (that is, do not affect internal
validity) since the randomized design of MTO should ensure that both the treatment and
control groups included highly motivated families. In other words, the ITT estimates are not
biased because they compare the outcomes of all members experimental group members
(both compliers and non-compliers) with all members of the control group (both those who
would and would not have complied had they received the offer). Differences between
compliers and noncompliers do, however, affect the generalizability (external validity) of
our TOT estimates: we cannot assume that the impacts we observe for the treatment
compliers would generalize to the non-compliers if relocating had been mandatory.
Another complicating issue is whether being offered a voucher affected families even if they
did not use the voucher to move. Some non-complier families searched for but were unable
to find housing in the type of low-poverty areas to which the experimental voucher required
them to move, and the search experience could potentially have benefited them later (outside
the context of the MTO voucher). Conversely, failure to find housing could have
disheartened these families and discouraged them from future housing searches.
We believe that any effect on non-compliers is likely to be modest relative to the effects of
actually using a voucher to move. We can also see empirically that very few of the control
group families and very few of the non-compliers in the experimental group relocate to the
types of neighborhoods to which the experimental group compliers initially move. On
average, the neighborhoods that MTO treatment and control groups were living in at the
time they enrolled in MTO had poverty rates of over 50 % (Ludwig 2012). One year after
random assignment, the experimental group compliers were living in neighborhoods with
average poverty rates of 15 %, whereas the control group and experimental non-compliers
were still living in neighborhoods where about 50 % of residents are poor.
If we are willing to impose the additional assumption that experimental or Section 8
treatment assignment only affects the outcomes of families that actually relocate through
MTO, then one can also estimate the effects of MTO moves on those who actually moved
using an MTO program housing voucher (the “treatment on the treated,” or TOT, effect).
The basic idea behind the TOT is that we observed outcomes for both the treatment group
compliers and non-compliers as well as for the entire control group. If we assume that the
“would-be non-compliers” in the control group (those who would not have moved had they
been given a chance) are similar to the treatment group noncompliers, then we can back out
an estimate of outcomes for the “would-be compliers” in the control group and compare
them with the observed outcomes for the actual compliers in the treatment group. The TOT
effect is therefore the difference in outcomes for people who moved in conjunction with the
program and those who would have moved had they been given a chance.
Sciandra et al. Page 13













We calculate the TOT effect with two-stage least squares by using indicators for random
assignment to treatment as instrumental variables for actually moving through MTO (see
Angrist et al. 1996). In a model without additional baseline covariates this would be
equivalent to dividing the ITT point estimate and its standard error by the share of families
assigned to the treatment group that move through MTO (Bloom 1984). This approach
provides further evidence for why the TOT is not biased by the fact that families who
comply with treatment may be different from non-compliers. As argued above, the ITT
estimate is not biased by differences between compliers and non-compliers. Moreover, our
TOT estimate is basically the ratio of two ITT effects: the ITT effect on the behavioral
outcome of interest (involvement in crime or violence) divided by the ITT effect on moving
with an MTO voucher. Given the MTO compliance rates reported above, the TOT effects
for the experimental and Section 8 groups will be about 2.4 and 1.7 times the ITT effects for
these groups, respectively.
Because both the ITT and TOT effects are important when evaluating the MTO experiment,
we include discussion of both effects below. MTO was a voluntary program—eligible
families volunteered to be entered into the lottery for assignment to treatment and control
groups, and families randomized into the two treatment groups chose to move using their
MTO vouchers or to remain in their baseline housing arrangement. Any future housing
policy that might be informed by the MTO results would presumably also be voluntarily, so
the compliance rate and the ITT results tell us about the effects of a voluntary housing
assistance program. However, when evaluating “neighborhood effects”, it is important to
analyze the effects on families who actually moved to low-poverty areas, which is why we
also include the TOT effects. However, because the TOT effects can be roughly calculated
using the ITT effects as described above, only the ITT effects are presented in the tables.
We also estimate the relationship between male violent-crime arrests and neighborhood
share minority (M). Using ordinary least squares to estimate this relationship could yield
biased estimates because of a possible correlation of share minority with unmeasured
individual characteristics that influence both neighborhood selection and criminal behavior.
Instead, we use a modified version of the instrumental variables (IV) approach of Kling et
al. (2007) to estimate the relationship. In our IV models, we use interactions of MTO
random assignment with indicators for the five 2-year time periods following randomization
as instrumental variables to generate predicted values of share minority that are then
substituted into the second stage (Eq. (3) below), which also includes a set of baseline
characteristics (X) for greater precision:
(3)
IV estimation essentially fits a dose–response model to determine whether the time periods
and treatment groups in which male youth experienced larger impacts on share minority also
experienced larger impacts on violent-crime arrests. This approach assumes that the only
pathway through which the instruments affect criminal behavior is through neighborhood
minority composition. Because MTO changed many neighborhood attributes and socio-
demographic characteristics such as share poor and share minority are highly correlated, we
cannot completely isolate the effects of one neighborhood attribute. We illustrate our IV
model results by showing a regression line fitted to the average values of share minority and
violent-crime arrests (relative to the overall means for the time period) for the 15 data points
corresponding to our instruments created by interacting the three treatment groups with 5
time periods.
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Using data collected through 10–15 years after random assignment, we find that MTO
generates large differences in average neighborhood conditions across randomly-assigned
groups that shrink over time. We also show that, in the years immediately following random
assignment, MTO generates substantial reductions in violent-crime arrests but sizable
increases in property-crime arrests, primarily among males. These MTO effects on crime
generally seem to attenuate over time as the MTO effect on neighborhood conditions
attenuates. We also find that among the youth who are 15–25 at the end of 2001, there is
little evidence that those who were relatively younger at baseline benefit more from MTO
than those who were older at baseline. Taken together, these findings suggest that what
Sampson (2012) calls “situational” neighborhood effects may be relatively more important
than “developmental” neighborhood effects.
Neighborhood characteristics
As reported in prior publications using data from the MTO long-term evaluation (see, for
example, Ludwig et al. 2011, 2012 and Sanbonmatsu et al. 2011), Table 2A demonstrates
that both the experimental and Section 8 groups were on average living in neighborhoods
that were better off economically through 10 years after random assignment. Although the
size of the differences decreased over time, the differences remain statistically significant
ten years post-randomization. Another general trend is that the experimental-control group
differences tend to be larger in magnitude than the Section 8-control group differences.
Initial differences between treatment and control groups were large: The experimental group
ITT for neighborhood poverty for females (−12.2 percentage points) in the first 2 years of
the post-random assignment period represents a nearly 25 % decrease from the control mean
of almost 50 %, while the Section 8 group ITT (−10.3 percentage points) represents roughly
a 20 % decrease. These effects are equivalent to a 0.81 standard deviation decrease in
poverty for females in the experimental group relative to the control group and a 0.68
standard deviation decrease for Section 8 group females. Another way to think about these
effect sizes is within the context of the national tract poverty distribution. One–two years
after random assignment, control group females were living in census tracts that were 2.8
standard deviations above the national mean in the Census 2000 data. The experimental
treatment reduced tract poverty by nearly 1 full standard deviation relative to the Census
2000 mean while the Section 8 treatment reduction was 0.84 standard deviation.
Furthermore, because not all families in the experimental and Section 8 groups used their
MTO vouchers to move, the TOT effects are even more substantial: experimental group
females in families who moved through MTO experienced a 28.3 percentage point (1.88
standard deviation) drop in neighborhood poverty, while the poverty reduction was 17.3
percentage points (1.15 standard deviations) for Section 8 group females in families who
moved through MTO. MTO’s effects on neighborhood conditions were generally similar for
male and female youth. Formal tests for the null hypothesis that the ITT effects for males
and females are equivalent are presented in the rightmost column of Table 2. Few
differences are significant.
While MTO was explicitly designed to help families move to lower-poverty neighborhoods,
given the strong correlation in different measures of neighborhood socioeconomic
composition, MTO helped families move to neighborhoods that differed on a wide range of
other indicators of economic disadvantage as well (see Appendix Table 4). For example,
over the course of 10- to 15-year period between random assignment and May 2008, female
youth in the experimental group lived in neighborhoods that on average had a higher share
of college-educated neighbors (0.044 ITT, 0.155 control mean), and mean income in
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experimental group neighborhoods was 30% higher than in the control group neighborhoods
(for the Section 8 group, mean income was about 20 % higher).
MTO generated large and persistent differences in neighborhood characteristics over the
course of the 10-year follow-up period that we examine here. However, differences between
the treatment and control groups decreased over time, and while still statistically significant,
by 9–10 years after random assignment, the differences were much more modest. A sizable
share of the convergence over time across groups in average neighborhood conditions
occurs because of improvements over time in the neighborhoods experienced by the control
group. For example, from 1–2 years after baseline to the period 9–10 years after baseline,
the experimental ITT on neighborhood poverty for males declined by about 4 percentage
points (from 11.2 to 7.1). Over this period, the control group’s average poverty rate declined
by 13 percentage points (from about 49 % in years 1–2 to about 36 % in years 9–10). This
implies that, while the treatment group neighborhoods were on average becoming less poor
over time, after the initial wave of MTO moves occurred, the rate at which neighborhood
poverty declined was even faster for the control group than for the treatment groups.
Although neighborhood race and poverty composition tend to be strongly correlated in the
cross-section in observational data, MTO wound up having only modest effects on
neighborhood racial composition for program participants (in proportional terms). Even 1–2
years after random assignment, when the experimental ITT for females on tract share
minority was 8.7 percentage points, the average treatment group youth was still living in
neighborhoods that were overwhelmingly populated by other minorities (with more than
four of five residents being from a minority race or ethnic group). Furthermore, the
difference between Section 8 and control group youth on share minority was marginally
significant for males only in years 1–2 and not significant for males or females in later years.
One slight complication to the analysis presented above stems from the difficulty of tracking
young people over time as they age and move away from their parents, who originally
applied to MTO and so form the core of our follow-up study sample. For cost reasons, we
focused on surveying the heads of the original MTO households and the participants who
were youth (ages 10–20) at the time of the long-term follow-up, and we therefore rely on a
variety of imperfect data sources to track addresses for those who were ages 15–25 at the
time of the interim (4–7) year follow-up but grown children (ages 21–30) at the time of the
long-term study. We examined three alternative, restricted samples based on the nature of
the address history data available, and we generally find that the statistically significant
treatment differences are robust to the alternative specifications and that the overall pattern
of results for neighborhood outcomes does not change dramatically (see Appendix Table 5).
7
Criminal behavior
Table 2C and D also show that, while MTO had few statistically significant effects on youth
arrests averaged over the entire follow-up period, there are signs of sizable effects on arrest
7The experimental group impacts from the models limited to (1) the youth for whom we have fairly complete address information via
address updates from the adult long-term survey interview (the proxy address sample), and (2) the youth who were still living with the
adult as of the long-term survey are very similar to those for the main sample. But the Section 8 results are less robust across
specifications, particularly in later years. However, because for cost reasons we sought interviews with only a random two-thirds of
adults from Section 8 households, these restricted analysis samples are rather small, leading to power concerns. Furthermore, the
results from the specification where we extrapolate from the youth’s address at age 18 demonstrate the importance of tracking the
youth over time because the effects of MTO on neighborhood characteristics, especially for females, appear stronger in these models
than they do in the unadjusted results and the two other alternative specifications. Because the address at 18 is more likely to have
been the home of the household head, it appears that the youth were leaving home and moving to somewhat worse neighborhoods than
where their parents lived.
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rates concentrated among males during the first 2–4 years following random assignment.
Over time, as the MTO effects on neighborhood conditions attenuate, these MTO impacts on
arrests also seem to attenuate at least for experimental group males.
One feature of Table 2 that is common to studies of “street crime”, but is nonetheless worthy
of comment, is the substantial gender difference in arrest rates. Among male youth who
were 15–25 at the end of 2001, fully 61 % were arrested at least once in the 10 years after
random assignment compared with only 30 % of females (not shown). Scaling up to the full
10-year follow-up period, the control group mean for the number of arrests for all crime
types among males across groups was almost 4 arrests per person (including 0.79 violent-
and 0.83 property-crime arrests). Neither experimental nor Section 8 group females
committed fewer crimes than their control group counterparts, but arrest rates among the
females were very low overall. Again, scaling up the results to the full 10-year follow-up
period, the control group mean for the number of arrests for all crime types among females
was about 0.8, and the arrest rate per year was no higher than 0.1 in any of the five 2-year
periods.
Table 2 shows that, during the period right after randomization, MTO generated sizable
reductions in violent-crime arrests among experimental group males. Violent-crime arrests
among experimental group males were almost a third lower than among control group males
in years 1–2 and 3–4. Since fewer than half of the families of these youth who were assigned
to the experimental group moved with a MTO voucher, the TOT effect is more than twice as
large as the ITT effect here. These very large reductions in violent-crime arrests were no
longer statistically significant by years 5–6. There was no statistically significant effect of
the Section 8 treatment on violent-crime arrests for male youth. (These results are
qualitatively similar if we restrict the analysis sample to male youth ages 15–20 at the end of
2001.)
Property-crime arrests did not differ between the experimental and control group males with
the exception of years 3–4 post-RA when experimental males were arrested more often than
control group males. Although only marginally significant (p<.10), this result is large in
proportional terms: the ITT effect is nearly one-third of the control mean.8 The Section 8
treatment seems to reduce property-crime arrests for male youth in the first two post-
baseline years (by 42 %) and in the last two post-baseline years (by 29 %, p<.10).
Discussion
This paper presents a long-term (10-year) follow-up of the effects of the MTO residential
mobility experiment on youth who were ages 15–25 at the end of 2001 (the group studied by
Kling et al. (2005) about 4–7 years after random assignment). We find large and statistically
significant reductions in violent-crime arrest rates among male youth assigned to the
experimental rather than control group, concentrated during the first 4 years following
random assignment, and adverse effects on property-crime arrests, which are also
concentrated during the first few years after random assignment.
Given the significant effects on Section 8 male property-crime arrests at the beginning and
end of the follow-up period, a natural question is why there were no effects in the
intervening years. The standard errors around our estimates do not let us rule out the
8The results presented here differ slightly from those presented in Kling et al. (2005) because we resubmitted the identifying
information for these youth to the criminal justice agencies to match again from scratch, and the matching procedures used by the
agencies changed slightly from when these identifiers were submitted for matching for the interim (4- to 7-year) MTO study. We rely
on the data we received back for the long-term MTO study match so that we can consistently examine how MTO impacts on arrests
evolve over time.
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possibility that there were some modest sustained impacts on arrests over time for these
youth. Additionally, the experimental-control ITT for property-crime arrests in years 9–10 is
not quite statistically significant (p=0.11) but is also large as a fraction of the control mean
—about 25 %.
Why do the MTO impacts on arrest rates for male youth in the experimental group –
particularly the beneficial effects on of violent-crime arrests —attenuate over time? One
candidate explanation for the changes over time in MTO’s effects on arrests among
experimental group males is that they are driven by the size of MTO’s effect on
contemporaneous neighborhood conditions, and that the attenuation of these effects on
arrests over time is due to the attenuation of MTO’s effects on neighborhood environments.
Figure 1 shows the pattern implied by the results presented in Table 2 for how MTO’s effect
on violent-crime arrests for males changes in response to the effect on neighborhood
minority concentration. There appears to be a relationship between the size of the
neighborhood “dose” and the size of the arrest “response”, with a pattern suggesting that
generally larger reductions in violent-crime arrests occur during periods when the MTO
effect on neighborhood conditions (in this case, census tract share minority) is larger.
Another hypothesis that a criminologist might consider stems from the well-known age–
crime curve: perhaps this cohort of youth is simply “aging out” of their crime-prone years,
so that our study sample is no longer engaged in criminal activity towards the end of our 10-
year follow-up period (the average age of the youth in our sample 10 years after random
assignment is almost 23). Perhaps over time, there is just no crime to be prevented through
changing neighborhoods? Yet this explanation does not square well with the data presented
in Table 2, which shows that the control means for violent- and property-crime arrests are
higher in the later years of the follow-up period.
A different candidate explanation is that crime rates themselves were changing over the
course of the study period, since MTO began enrolling families in 1994—not long after the
start of the sizable drop in crime rates observed over the 1990s nationwide (see, for example,
Levitt 2004 for a discussion and candidate explanations). However, because MTO was
structured as a random assignment experiment, secular changes that affected all places
equally should have similar effects on the offending patterns of youth assigned to control
and treatment conditions.
Because we rely on administrative records on arrests to MTO youth, rather than directly
measure youth criminal behavior, our analysis could be affected if the likelihood that a
crime results in arrest varies systematically between more and less disadvantaged
neighborhoods. The interim follow-up survey in MTO asked household heads about the
likelihood that police respond to 911 calls, with a pattern of responses that suggests police
may be more responsive in lower-poverty areas. If the probability of arrest is indeed higher
in lower-poverty areas, our analysis would understate any protective MTO effects to prevent
crime and overstate any adverse effects of MTO moves on criminal behavior. That is, our
analysis may understate the beneficial effects on violent crime and overstate adverse effects
on property crime. However, it is not entirely clear why this pattern should change over
time, and so it is not clear that differential enforcement can explain the evolution of MTO
effects on arrests over time. It could be the case that low-income, minority youth as in MTO
learn over time to better “blend in” or interact with law enforcement in low-poverty areas.
But this explanation would predict that the beneficial MTO effect in reducing violent-crime
arrests in the few years right after random assignment should actually increase rather than
decrease (in absolute value) over time.
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Perhaps a more plausible explanation for the adverse effect of MTO on property-crime
arrests is that there is simply more valuable loot to steal in less racially and economically
segregated areas compared with the more disadvantaged communities in which the control
group families reside. This hypothesis also provides an explanation for why the MTO effect
on property offending declines over time—because the treatment-control difference in
neighborhood conditions converges over the 10-year study period. Another possibility is that
fade-out represents acclimation to the new neighborhoods. For example, males moving to
new neighborhoods may initially act out and steal items, but this behavior may stop once
they become accustomed to the neighborhood and form social connections.
More generally, our pattern of findings seems to be more consistent with the relative
importance of “situational” neighborhood effects that depend on the environments in which
decisions to engage in crime or not are made, rather than to “developmental” neighborhood
effects that influence the quality of the developmental environments children experience
growing up. The developmental neighborhood hypothesis has the additional testable
prediction that MTO youth who are relatively younger at baseline should be more
responsive to MTO moves than those older at baseline, because they experience larger
neighborhood changes during a more developmentally “plastic” life stage. To test this
hypothesis, we interact a linear term for baseline age with treatment assignment among our
sample of youth 15–25 as of the end of 2001 and find no pattern of statistical significance
(i.e. the effect of MTO on the criminal behavior of younger youth does not differ from the
effect on older youth).
The findings described above also fit the pattern of previous studies, including studies from
the MTO interim evaluation, where treatment group females fare better (or at least are no
worse off) than their control counterparts and males are arrested less for violent crimes but
are actually arrested more for property crimes. Kling et al. (2005) examined variation by
gender in three candidate explanations when reviewing the gender differences in the interim
MTO results: mobility patterns, discrimination, and adaptability. They largely ruled out the
first two explanations because neither varied systematically by gender. Our results are
consistent: Table 2 shows that (1) the impacts on neighborhood characteristics by gender are
quite similar, especially earlier in the post-randomization period when effects on criminal
behavior are strongest, and (2) the effects on neighborhood racial composition, while
statistically significant, were more modest than the effects on neighborhood economic
composition, and even experimental group youth who moved with a voucher lived in high-
minority neighborhoods. Kling et al. (2005) find some evidence that MTO youth differ in
their adaptability to new neighborhoods, however, and point to a comparative advantage in
property offending that affects males more than females due to lower achievement test
scores and higher school absence rates, less adult supervision, and more friends who have
engaged in risky and delinquent behavior.
Furthermore, the findings presented here are consistent with the idea that neighborhood
conditions may have an important influence on the violent criminal behavior of youth in
particular, and also with the idea that contemporaneous rather than lagged neighborhood
conditions (particularly minority composition), i.e. situation neighborhood effects, may be
the most important determinant of the neighborhood’s influence on violent behavior. Our
analysis does not isolate the specific mechanisms through which neighborhood conditions
might affect youth violence, but the exercise of tracking youth over the long term that we
present here begins to narrow down the range of mechanisms that are consistent with the
data. Our findings are also consistent with the optimistic view that even the criminal
behavior of adolescents who have been exposed to distressed neighborhood conditions for
extended periods may be sensitive to changes in the offending environment. The young
people growing up in our nation’s distressed urban neighborhoods, even those who have
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already reached their peak offending ages, appear to be affected in important ways by their
current situation.
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Instrumental variable estimation of the relationship between violent-crime arrests and tract
share minority for male youth. The y-axis is the number of arrests per year for violent
crimes. The x-axis is share minority (the fraction of census tract residents who are members
of racial or ethnic minority groups), which is linearly interpolated from the 1990 and 2000
decennial census and 2005–2009 American Community Survey and is weighted by the time
respondents lived at all of their addresses during each two-year window in the follow-up
period (through 10 years after random assignment). The points represent the 2-year follow-
up window (e.g. Yr 1–2=post-random assignment years 1 and 2) and treatment group (E
experimental group, S Section 8 group, C control group). The line through the data points is
equivalent to a two-stage least-squares estimate of the relationship between the annual
number of arrests and the mediator, using interactions of 2-year follow-up window and
treatment group as instruments for the mediator (conditional on 2-year follow-up window
main effects). The size of each point is proportional to the sum of the weights for that group
and, correspondingly, to the weight that the point receives in the two-stage least squares
regression. Our instrumental variable (IV) estimation, controlling for the covariates listed in
Appendix Table 3, shows that a 1 percentage point decrease in share minority is associated
with a 0.165 decrease in the number of violent-crime arrests per year (SE=0.102, p=0.108).
(The slope of the graph presented here differs very slightly from the IV coefficient listed
above because the individual-level covariates could not be fully collapsed to the treatment
group-time period level; regression residuals were used instead). Source and sample:
individual criminal justice system arrest data: adult and juvenile data from California,
Illinois, Maryland, and Massachusetts; de-identified adult data from New York State;
juvenile data from New York City; and adult or juvenile records from 8 additional states in
which participants have lived. The sample is male core household members ages 15–25 as of
December 31, 2001 and under age 18 at baseline for whom arrest data are available
(n=2,364)
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Table 1
Baseline characteristics of the youth sample (1994–1998)
Females Males
Experimental Section 8 Control Experimental Section 8 Control
Age as of December 31, 2007
 21 0.137 0.144 0.154 0.129 0.148 0.134
 22 0.127 0.157 0.132 0.137 0.120* 0.153
 23 0.129 0.121 0.119 0.132 0.130 0.136
 24-26 0.345 0.339 0.369 0.340 0.376* 0.331
 27-31 0.261 0.240 0.226 0.261 0.225 0.246
Other characteristics
 Gifted student or did advanced coursework 0.153 0.179 0.163 0.142 0.144 0.173
 Suspended or expelled from school in past
  two years
0.103 0.094 0.087 0.207 0.183 0.189
 School called about behavior in past two
  years
0.218 0.199 0.197 0.377 0.342 0.372
 Behavioral or emotional problems 0.052 * 0.058 ** 0.034 0.124 0.119 0.115
 Learning problems 0.122 0.110 0.117 0.252 0.219 0.244
 Health problems that limited activity 0.045 0.053 0.057 0.096 * 0.085 0.067
 Health problems that required special
  medicine or equipment
0.054 0.053 0.053 0.106 0.138 ** 0.091
Ever arrested before random assignment
 Any crime 0.031 0.023 ** 0.042 0.103 0.094 0.088
 Violent crime 0.013 0.011 0.022 0.052 * 0.056 ** 0.032
 Property crime 0.011 0.009 0.016 0.049 0.035 0.039
Site
 Baltimore 0.168 0.141 0.141 0.149 0.149 0.141
 Boston 0.177 0.187 0.210 0.159 0.190 0.181
 Chicago 0.204 0.202 0.193 0.209 0.211 0.200
 Los Angeles 0.203 0.241 0.239 0.231 0.226 0.232
 New York 0.248 0.229 0.216 0.253 0.224 0.245
Sample size 930 646 701 957 690 719
All values represent shares. Values were calculated using sample weights to account for changes in random assignment ratios across randomization
cohorts. Missing values were imputed based on gender, age, randomization site, and whether randomized through 1997 or in 1998.
Source and sample: all measures except the arrest measures come from the MTO baseline survey. The baseline head completed the baseline survey,
providing information on both the household and its individual members. The arrest measures come from individual criminal justice system arrest
data: adult and juvenile data from California, Illinois, Maryland, and Massachusetts; de-identified adult data from New York State; juvenile data
from New York City; and adult or juvenile records from 8 additional states in which participants have lived. The sample is cor e household
members ages 15–25 as of December 31,2001 and under age 18 at baseline (n=4,643)
Measures: age as of December 31, 2007 determined eligibility for the long-term survey and provides a rough estimate of youth age as of the end of
the 10-year post-random assignment window analyzed for the paper. Violent-crime arrests involve charges of force or threat of force including
homicide, rape, robbery, assault, kidnapping, and weapons charges. Property-crime arrests involve taking money or property and include burglary,
motor vehicle theft, larceny, trespassing, and receiving stolen property. Any crime arrests include violent- and property-crime arrests as well as
arrests for any other charge, including drug crimes (possession or distribution), disorderly conduct, and moving violations
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***Significant at the 1 % level on an independent group t-test of the difference between the control group and the experimental group or the
Section 8 group
**Significant at the 5 % level
*
significant at the 10 % level
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Table 2
Effects on neighborhood conditions and number of arrests by year since random assignment
Females Males Male–female
difference
Intent to treat effect Intent to treat effect Intent to treat effect
CM E–C S–C CM E–C S–C E–C S–C
A. Neighborhood share poor
 1–2 years since RA 0.489
−0.122 *** −0.103 *** 0.487 −0.112 *** −0.092 *** 0.010 0.011
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
 3–4 years since RA 0.439
−0.120 *** −0.094 *** 0.437 −0.117 *** −0.091 *** 0.003 0.003
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
 5–6 years since RA 0.400
−0.088 *** −0.071 *** 0.406 −0.100 *** −0.078 *** −0.012 −0.007
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
 7–8 years since RA 0.372
−0.065 *** −0.055 *** 0.378 −0.081 *** −0.069 *** −0.016 −0.014
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
 9–10 years since RA 0.350
−0.048 *** −0.042 *** 0.361 −0.071 *** −0.060 *** −0.023 * −0.017
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
B. Neighborhood share minority
 1–2 years since RA 0.899
−0.087 *** −0.012 0.903 −0.079 *** −0.018 * 0.008 −0.006
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012)
 3–4 years since RA 0.893
−0.080 *** −0.014 0.893 −0.073 *** −0.011 0.007 0.003
(0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
 5–6 years since RA 0.874
−0.040 *** −0.001 0.889 −0.058 *** −0.016 −0.018 −0.015
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
 7–8 years since RA 0.866
−0.038 *** 0.004 0.882 −0.054 *** −0.020 −0.016 −0.025
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017)
 9–10 years since RA 0.859
−0.038 *** −0.007 0.869 −0.045 *** −0.011 −0.008 −0.004
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018)
C. Number of annual violent-crime arrests
 1–2 years since RA 0.0127 0.0093 0.0044 0.0596
−0.0197 * −0.0082 −0.0290 ** −0.0126
(0.0058) (0.0063) (0.0111) (0.0121) (0.0129) (0.0137)
 3–4 years since RA 0.0249 0.0027 −0.0019 0.0776
−0.0231 ** 0.0003 −0.0259 * 0.0022
(0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0114) (0.0141) (0.0133) (0.0149)
 5–6 years since RA 0.0304 −0.0053 −0.0088 0.0880 0.0002 0.0135 0.0056 0.0223
(0.0075) (0.0085) (0.0135) (0.0166) (0.0156) (0.0180)
 7–8 years since RA 0.0274 −0.0051 −0.0097 0.0911 0.0056 −0.0014 0.0107 0.0082
(0.0077) (0.0081) (0.0138) (0.0148) (0.0153) (0.0167)
 9–10 years since RA 0.0243 −0.0090 −0.0051 0.0811 0.0003 0.0084 0.0093 0.0135
(0.0073) (0.0078) (0.0117) (0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0157)
 1–10 years since RA 0.0239 −0.0015 −0.0042 0.0795 −0.0073 0.0025 −0.0059 0.0067
(0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0071) (0.0085) (0.0081) (0.0093)
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Females Males Male–female
difference
Intent to treat effect Intent to treat effect Intent to treat effect
CM E–C S–C CM E–C S–C E–C S–C
D. Number of annual property-crime arrests
 1–2 years since RA 0.0193 −0.0070 −0.0035 0.0522 −0.0081
−0.0221 ** −0.0011 −0.0186 *
(0.0050) (0.0067) (0.0095) (0.0090) (0.0105) (0.0111)
 3–4 years since RA 0.0299 −0.0106 −0.0048 0.0728 0.0223 * 0.0135 0.0329 ** 0.0183
(0.0076) (0.0098) (0.0134) (0.0146) (0.0156) (0.0173)
 5–6 years since RA 0.0292 −0.0054 0.0079 0.0883 0.0172 0.0153 0.0226 0.0074
(0.0087) (0.0101) (0.0148) (0.0185) (0.0163) (0.0201)
 7–8 years since RA 0.0282 0.0007 0.0000 0.0853 0.0129 −0.0013 0.0121 −0.0013
(0.0075) (0.0086) (0.0141) (0.0150) (0.0161) (0.0172)
 9–10 years since RA 0.0266 −0.0048 −0.0012 0.1166 −0.0286
−0.0342 * −0.0238 −0.0330
(0.0068) (0.0097) (0.0180) (0.0183) (0.0184) (0.0203)
 1–10 years since RA 0.0266 −0.0054 −0.0003 0.0831 0.0031 −0.0058 0.0085 −0.0055
(0.0042) (0.0060) (0.0082) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0104)
The estimates are from an ordinary least squares regression of each outcome on treatment indicators (experimental and Section 8 effects were
estimated in one model) and the baseline covariates listed in Appendix Table 3. Impacts by gender were estimated as an interaction with treatment
status. Robust standard errors adjusted for household clustering are in parentheses.
Source and sample: census tract characteristics are interpolated data from the 1990 and 2000 decennial censuses as well as the 2005–2009
American Community Survey. Arrest measures are from individual criminal justice system data: adult and juvenile data from California, Illinois,
Maryland, and Massachusetts; de-identified adult data from New York State; juvenile data from New York City; and adult or juvenile records from
8 additional states in which participants have lived. The sample for the neighborhood measures is core household members ages 15–25 as of
December 31, 2001 and under age 18 at baseline (n=4,643) and the sample for the arrest measures is the limited to the subset of those youth for
whom arrest data are available (n=4,641)
Measures: The arrest measures are based on quarterly arrest data rescaled to represent the number of arrests per year. Violent-crime arrests involve
charges of force or threat of force including homicide, rape, robbery, assault, kidnapping, and weapons charges. Property-crime arrests involve
taking money or property and include burglary, motor vehicle theft, larceny, trespassing, and receiving stolen property. Total arrests include
violent- and property-crime arrests as well as arrests for any other charges, including drug possession and distribution, disorderly conduct, and
moving violations
E–C experimental–control, S–C Section 8–control, CM control mean
***
Treatment–control difference is significant at the 1 % level
**
significant at the 5 % level
*
significant at the 10 % level
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